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Introduction 
What would have American sociology been like without Talcott Parsons’s translation of 
Max Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism? To try to answer such a 
question inevitable takes us to the domain of counter-factual thinking, so pervasive and 
profound was the impact of that work of translation. If we are to remain within the 
realm of social-scientific inquiry, however, one should pose a different question. 
Assuming that Parsons’s rendering of Weber’s words into American English created 
“world images” of Weber and his sociological significance that were to act “like 
switchmen” on a railroad, changing irrevocably the course of history (Weber, 1946: 
280), how is this “cyclopean moment” (Foucault 1991: 77) to be explained? This is why 
this chapter is as much about Weber and his ideas as it is about Parsons’s mediation of 
those ideas through the translation of the “sacred text” (Scaff 2005) of Weberian 
scholarship.  
Talcott Parsons (1902-1979) was one of the most influential sociologists of the 
twentieth century. His ideas and organizational skills helped make American sociology 
a global powerhouse in the post-war period: the general theory of action, structural-
functionalism, systems theory, and modernization theory are but different and 
successive aspects of the highly abstract and supremely ambitious theoretical building 
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Parsons developed consistently in the course of his 42-year long career at Harvard, a 
period which coincided with the mature phase of institutionalization of sociology in 
American academia (Trevino 2001). However, in a piece about his retirement for the 
New York Times, when asked about what his greatest contribution to sociology had 
been, Parsons singles out neither his immense theoretical achievements, nor his 
contribution towards institutionalizing sociology as an academic discipline in the United 
States. Instead, Parsons points to the translation of Max Weber’s The Protestant Ethic 
and the Spirit of Capitalism he had publish back in 1930. His justification for this 
choice was that, by translating Weber’s seminal essay, he had acted “as an importer” of 
Weber’s ideas about religion and capitalism into the Anglo-Saxon world.1 This passing 
remark provides the starting point for our argument in this chapter. As we will try to 
show, Parsons’s “importation” of Weber’s ideas via the translation-interpretation of The 
Protestant Ethic turned out to be a pivotal event not only for his career, but to the very 
path of development of sociology in the twentieth century.  
 Parsons was only 23-years old when he read Weber for the first time, and 
embarked on the translation of The Protestant Ethic a little over a year later. The 
immediate motivation seem to have been to respond to a suggestion by a senior 
colleague interested in promoting Weber’s ideas in America, but the most profound 
reason was intellectual. The young Parsons was convinced he had found in Weber the 
theoretical and methodological answer to understand the origins and implications of 
capitalism, the problem that afflicted him at the time. This is what explains both his 
interest in pursuing a doctorate in Germany on Sombart’s and Weber’s theories of 
capitalism, and his translation of Weber’s essay. Contrary to what is widely assumed 
(e.g. Camic 1991: xxvii), however, Parsons’s doctoral dissertation did not follow the 
work of translation. Archival research shows that Parsons wrote his dissertation while 
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he was translating Weber’s essay (Gerhardt 2011). In fact, the translation stands right in 
between two different versions of the doctoral dissertation. The first written in German 
and almost universally ignored until now, and the second in English that was published 
in 1928-1929 in the form of two articles in The Journal of Political Economy. It is this 
specific sense that we approach Parsons as a translator-interpreter. Parsons’s early 
encounter with Weber’s theories and methodology is a gradual process mediated by the 
edition, and translation from German to English, of The Protestant Ethic. This is why to 
ignore Parsons’ German dissertation is to miss a crucial early step in the development of 
his sociological thinking, and the source of much misunderstanding.  
 One common mistake is to read the early work of Parsons as if it anticipates his 
later writings. This obfuscates rather than clarifies his thinking: the methodological 
suggestion is to look for “implicit” (e.g. Wearne 1989: 57) signs of positions Parsons 
was to adopt years later, rather than interpret them in their own right. More generally, as 
in the young Marx, this fails to do justice to his early work as an independent phase of 
intellectual development. Another mistake has been to reduce Parsons’s theoretical 
efforts to strategic and materialistic career-oriented choices (Camic 1987). While the 
latter certainly helped frame some of Parsons’s decisions at the time, the fact remains 
that this fundamentally lessens and misrepresents the intellectual labour involved in the 
interpretation of texts. This is especially true of formative texts, which often represent 
the most challenging hermeneutical encounter in one’s career. Weber’s writings seem to 
fit this exactly, but, again, Camic’s reservations regarding “Parsons’s Weber” may have 
reinforced even more his willingness to downplay this early intellectual encounter and 
stress instead materialistic considerations (Alexander and Sciortino 1996: 167). Our 
claim here stands closer to the more hermeneutical strand of the so-called “new Weber 
studies,” which use detailed historical reconstructions to address questions pertaining to 
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the sociology of translation, sociology of knowledge, and sociology of academic 
disciplines (e.g. Ghosh 2014; Chalcraft 2008).  
 Our focus is on the translator
2
 behind the author, i.e. on the work of translation 
as one involving a degree of interpretation but also of material composition of the work, 
which is especially the case when, such as to a certain extent in this case, the translator 
also happens to be the editor. Here, hermeneutics meets material culture studies 
halfway. Parsons’ translation involves not just words, but also sentences and even the 
whole text, the text as a whole, and Weber’s thinking as a whole. But pace Dilthey and 
contemporary Weberian experts such as Peter Ghosh (1994, 2001), no translator ever 
provides a full description of the whole. What any translator, Parsons included, can at 
best offer is “points of view, perspectives, partial visions of the world.” (Ricoeur 2006: 
27) This is why Parsons never ceased to make himself clear as to what Weber meant 
and what Weber’s contribution was to sociology. In short, we will show the extent to 
which Parsons’s coming to terms with Weber’s ideas has been mediated by the editorial 
work of material composition of the book, including typographical features, the nature 
of the contents to be included as well as its order of appearance in the volume, as well 
as by his work as translator.  
 With the figure of the translator-interpreter at its heart, this chapter is also about 
the circulation and transmission of ideas. Weber’s ideas about the religious origins of 
capitalism originate in turn of the century Germany, travel across the Atlantic via 
Parsons’s translation and interpretation, return to post-war Germany as a sociological 
classic, and are eventually disseminated throughout the globe as they become part and 
parcel of the discipline’s self-understanding (e.g. Gerhardt 2010; Lidz 2010; Scaff 2014: 
17 ff.). The politics of the book will be shown to play a significant role in this process, 
for the struggle over the control of the material format that sustains those ideas is a key 
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component of their reception by any community of readers. Either by writing a new 
preface to a reprint of The Protestant Ethic in the late 1950s, a time when German 
historiography was actively trying to associate Weber’s work with monarchist and 
plebiscitary political tendencies (Mommsen 1959; 1963), by highlighting the theoretical 
relevance of Weber’s 1920 “Author’s Introduction” in his work in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, and by vehemently holding his ground as the editorial gatekeeper of the 
English-language version of the Protestant Ethic in a heated epistolary exchange with 
Anthony Giddens soon before his death, Parsons never waived in his belief that to 
control the Weberian legacy was to control the most widely read book in twentieth 
century sociology, the material embodiment of that legacy – the Protestant Ethic. In 
order to better understand Parsons’s reasons, as well as the circumstances framing his 
choices, let us now return to the moment and place when Parsons’ life-long engagement 
with the work began: the autumn of 1925 in Heidelberg, Germany. 
 
The forgotten text: Parsons’s German Doctoral Dissertation 
A central problem drives Parsons’s sojourn in Heidelberg in the academic year of 1925-
1926, a transforming experience which will turn the young Parsons into a life-long 
Weberian (pace Camic 2005: 249). That problem is capitalism: What is capitalism, 
where does it come from, how should one account for its civilizational implications? 
Parsons approached this problem as a sociologist, bringing Weber with him away from 
the realm of economic history and into the annals of sociological theorizing. Parsons’s 
response to this problem involves two interrelated intellectual tasks, which in turn will 
pave the way for his subsequent theorizing and canon-making endeavour in The 
Structure of Social Action (1937). The first task is to write a doctoral dissertation on 
capitalism in the works of Werner Sombart and Max Weber. Contrary to what is widely 
 6 
believed, this first task is divided into two separate stages, in which he writes two 
different versions of the doctoral dissertation. Separating these two versions is the 
second task: the edition and translation of Weber’s essay on the religious origins of 
capitalism, The Protestant Ethic. The remainder of this chapter is organized around each 
of these tasks. In this section, we discuss the first version of Parsons’s D.Phil. 
 Parsons’s decision to pursue doctoral studies abroad was far from unusual at the 
time. Having graduated from Amherst magna cum laude in 1924, Parsons, who was 
unimpressed by the graduate programmes on offer in the United States, turned to the 
obvious and traditional context of higher learning – Europe. Parsons’s first port of call 
in Europe was not Germany but England, though. Parsons spends the 1924-1925 
academic year as a non-degree student at the London School of Economics (LSE). 
There L.T. Hobhouse introduces Parsons to the field of sociology, in the form of a 
broadly construed inquiry of the “social” encompassing both social philosophy and 
economic and political institutions (Parsons 1977: 18). In addition, it is the combination 
of his undergraduate studies on institutional economics (namely, the courses with 
Walton Hamilton and Clarence Ayres at Amherst) and Richard Tawney and Edwin 
Cannan’s lectures on economic history at the LSE, which provides Parsons with the 
basic tools for understanding the problem of the age – the nature and origins of 
capitalism. That he eventually goes to Germany in the autumn of 1925 instead of 
returning for good to the United States, however, was entirely a matter of chance. As he 
will later recall (1980: 38), Parsons is awarded a fellowship in a post-war exchange 
program for the 1925-1926 academic year and, without having any say in the matter, is 
assigned to the University of Heidelberg. Enthused with the prospect of joining the 
oldest German university, which he visits in June 1925 and he hears about Weber for 
the first time (1980: 38), Parsons has one last problem to deal with. His command of 
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German, which had been good enough to study German philosophy at Amherst, was 
frankly insufficient to attend a German higher education program. The solution involves 
moving to Vienna, Austria and attending an intensive summer course in German. 
Finally, equipped with a satisfactory command of the German language and eager to 
learn what sociology had to say about the problem of capitalism, a youthful Parsons 
arrives in Heidelberg in the early days of the autumn of 1925. 
 Parsons’s time in Heidelberg is marked by his encounter with two figures who 
will change his intellectual life forever. One was Max Weber, who despite having died 
five years before was very much still the dominant intellectual presence in Heidelberg, 
namely through the famous “Weber circle” that included names such as Alfred Weber, 
Marianne Weber, Karl Jaspers, Karl Mannheim and Alexander von Schelting. The very 
first of Weber’s writings that he read was no other than Die protestantische Ethik und 
der ‘Geist’ des Kapitalismus, which gripped his interest immediately: he later recalls 
having read it “as if it were a detective story” (Parsons 1980: 39). The other was Edgar 
Salin, who agrees to supervise his D.Phil. on capitalism. Based at Basel and temporarily 
at Heidelberg at the time of Parsons’ visit (Gerhardt 2011: 71), Salin was an economist 
conversant with the German Historical School of economics and its critics. 
Unsurprisingly, it is Salin who suggests the dissertation to focus on the theories of 
capitalism by Marx, Sombart and Weber. Parsons begins working on his doctoral 
dissertation – titled Der Kapitalismus bei Sombart und Max Weber3– at the start of his 
second semester in Heidelberg, in early 1926.  
The first noteworthy aspect of Parsons’s doctoral project is the role of Marx. 
Contrary to what is widely believed, partly because of what Parsons led us to believe 
time and again, the fact is that in neither versions of the dissertation is there a chapter on 
Marx. This does not mean, however, that Marx is irrelevant for Parsons’s argument. On 
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the contrary, Marx provides the young Parsons with the theoretical benchmark 
according to which Sombart’s and Weber’s theories of capitalism are evaluated. Marx is 
positioned next to Hegel as the two main exponents of a distinctively German 
philosophical approach to history and, by extension, to capitalism. This German 
tradition constituted, in the eyes of the young Parsons, the main alternative to the 
utilitarian, individualistic and rationalistic approach dominant in orthodox economics. 
Parsons’s research question was: To what extent were Sombart and Weber viable 
alternatives to both orthodox economics and the German historical school? Answering 
this question amounted to identify the right theoretical-methodological approach to a 
key phenomenon of the modern age – capitalism. The structure of the dissertation 
reflects this concern. The dissertation, which is 140-pages-long, falls in six chapters. 
After a brief general introduction, there is a first substantive chapter on three 
contemporary German theories of capitalism (Richard Passow, Georg von Below and 
Lujo Brentano, respectively). This is followed by two lengthy chapters, which constitute 
the bulk of the dissertation. The first is on Sombart’s analysis of modern capitalism (pp. 
17-64), the other on Max Weber (pp. 65-106). The fifth chapter, entitled “The Facts of 
Capitalism,” offers a synthetic analysis of key aspects of the capitalist system, such as 
market relations or the role of technology. The dissertation concludes with a general 
critical assessment of Sombart and Weber’s theories of capitalism. The few scattered 
remarks on Marx in the text are there exclusively to help Parsons to frame his argument 
and help him evaluate Sombart’s and Weber’s achievements. 
 The main difference between Sombart and Weber in this regard was that while 
the former had articulated a theory of capitalism, the latter had only fragments and 
individual investigations. An “element of construction is therefore unavoidable, to a 
greater extent than in the case of Sombart,” observes Parsons in the chapter devoted to 
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Weber’s analysis of capitalism (1926: 66). Such “construction” involved a critical 
inquiry into a fundamental ambiguity in Weber’s definition of capitalism.4 For Parsons, 
there were “two different meanings of capitalism present in the works of Max Weber, 
which have relatively little to do with each other.” (1926: 66) One was “capitalism in 
general,” which was supposed to encompass all historical instances of the phenomenon. 
The other was “modern capitalism,” which referred to the historically specific 
experience of capitalist development in the West. The thrust of Parsons’s argument in 
this chapter, indeed in the German version of the dissertation as a whole, was to 
investigate the origins of this conceptual ambiguity, document its implications for 
Weber’s ability to explain capitalism, and eventually suggest an alternative approach. 
 The first instance of this ambiguity is found in Weber’s discussion of the 
objectivity, in the sense of a methodical, rational and continual pursuit for profit, that 
Weber claims to characterize both capitalism in general and modern capitalism. For 
Sombart and Marx, Parsons notes, this is a specific trait of modern capitalism. Parsons 
ventures a possible explanation for this apparent contradiction in Weber’s words 
“capitalist ordering of the entire society.” “Capitalist businesses, and therefore 
capitalism, exist everywhere” Parsons writes, “but a ‘capitalist ordering of the entire 
society’ exists only in the West.” (1926: 68) Objectivity, in other words, is a matter of 
degree. If traces of it can be found in all human societies, the fact remains than only in 
Western societies has it become a dominant feature. Of course, the analysis of the 
societal process of rationalisation is a key element of Weber’s sociological diagnosis of 
our epoch, a diagnosis marked by an irreversible pessimism. It is also, as we soon shall 
see, one of the key issues around which Parsons’s interpretation takes place. 
 “It can hardly be this capitalism of which Max Weber writes: ‘the most fateful 
power of our modern life,’” Parsons observes. Here he is surely referring to modern 
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capitalism. After examining the non-economic pre-conditions of modern capitalism, 
which include science, bureaucracy, the judicial system and urbanization, Parsons 
discusses its main features. These include the separation of the household from the 
business environment, double-entry bookkeeping, and the rational organization of work. 
In its pure form, the rational organization of work amounts to bureaucratization. Its 
main characteristics include competencies, official hierarchy, monetary economy, rigid 
discipline (which Parsons connects to the spirit of capitalism), and education, namely 
the training of experts and specialists. In Weber’s view, bureaucratization is the end 
result of rationalization and can thus be found in both capitalist and socialist systems. 
More important than its general character, however, are its ethical implications. Parsons 
notes that here “we are confronted with Weber’s pessimistic fatalism.” (1926: 84) 
Indeed, Weber is haunted by the prospect of an increasingly bureaucratized world, 
leading inexorably towards the fossilization and petrification of the human spirit.  
 For Weber, however, the tendency towards rationalisation is far from 
homogenous as there is no single, universal type of rationality. Instead, Weber stresses 
the relativity of all processes of rationalisation in the different societal domains: for 
instance, what is seen as rational in the domain of economics can be regarded as 
irrational from the domain of technology. The Weberian understanding of a “value-free 
science” asserting the full relativism of all rationality best emerge in The Protestant 
Ethic, to which Parsons devotes a 15-page-long discussion. This segment will not 
survive Parsons’s revision, though. This has partly to do with its descriptive character, 
but also because of two implications of this study to Weber’s overall theory of 
capitalism he will eventually abandon altogether or, as in the second case, refine.  
The first implication refers to the utilitarian implications of the spirit of 
capitalism, and the subsequent materialism this has helped produce. In the German 
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dissertation, Weber’s analysis of modern capitalism in The Protestant Ethic is said to 
portrait the capitalist system as primarily defined by its totalizing rationality and 
mechanistic quality, but also by its overriding materialism: “Things govern men, not the 
other way around.” Despite Weber’s criticism of Marx’s materialist conception of 
history, “even presenting his theory of Protestantism as a counter-thesis,” the truth was 
that “there is undeniably a tendency in capitalism itself to realize this idea. It will even 
happen if the development continues, that the mind actually plays no role in history and 
more will be reduced to mere servants.” Parsons concludes: “Here the materialist 
conception of history is put into perspective and made the characteristic of the capitalist 
age.” (1926: 102) Such a materialistic conclusion derives, in Parsons’s view, from the 
way in which Weber had conceived of the character and historical role of the spirit of 
capitalism. Even though the social ethics illustrated by Benjamin Franklin is not 
concerned with the maximization of happiness (far from it: it is entirely irrational and 
the source of profound anxiety), it ultimately leads “into a utilitarianism.” (1926: 89)  
 The second implication refers to the conceptual ambiguity between the two 
meanings of capitalism. The Protestant Ethic is a historical case, not a study of 
capitalism in general. Yet Weber ends up confusing the two “under the concept of the 
ideal type.” (1926: 105) This is because of his “comparative method.” As Parsons tries 
to explain, Weber “selects societal atoms and uses them to construct historical epochs 
and cultures. But the fact is that these atoms have a different meaning in different times 
and cultures. Here a ‘change of meaning’ takes place, in the sense of Karl Mannheim. 
That he neglects this, makes it impossible for him to elaborate a capitalist culture as a 
whole. Therefore, we think, he over exaggerates the importance of the rational 
organization of work and everything connected with it.” Parsons believes the source of 
this theoretical difficulty to be of conceptual nature: “The spirit of capitalism is, of 
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course, a specific modern-occidental thing. It is certainly not the spirit of capitalism in 
general. The result of such use of the term is a bad conceptual ambiguity.” (1926: 104) 
Parsons’s verdict is clear. “The main reason for this confusion”, he assures us, “is that 
Weber is trying to accommodate two different things under the concept of the ideal 
type.” “One has to make a choice,” Parsons argues. Either “capitalism is a general ideal 
type” or “capitalism must be a ‘historical individual.’” Given this conceptual confusion 
on Weber’s part, “the attempt failed.” (1926: 105) Although Parsons would maintain 
this verdict in the English version of the D.Phil.,
5
 the fact is that its nature changes 
substantially, evolving from a matter of conceptual ambiguity in need of clarification to 
a more sophisticated argument regarding Weber’s employment of ideal types as a 
concept formation strategy.  
 Parsons concludes this German version of the dissertation by the end of the 
summer semester of 1926, submits it to Salin, and returns to the United States where he 
has a one-year post as instructor in Economics waiting for him at Amherst College. A 
few months later, in December, Parsons asks his 2-chapter doctoral dissertation to be 
returned to him by mail, with the argument he wanted to add a third chapter. As it turns 
out, he will never return the original manuscript in German. Claiming it had got lost in 
the mail, Parsons will in fact resubmit a revised version of his dissertation in English in 
July 1927 and accepted by Heidelberg’s philosophy department. This version was 
eventually published in two parts in 1928 and 1929 in The Journal of Political 
Economy.
6
 What happened in the second half of 1926 that made Parsons act like this? 
 
Composing the Protestant Ethic 
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One finds evidence of the most likely explanation in a letter Parsons sent to Marianne 
Weber in April 1927. He begins by saying that: “Some months ago, I was asked to 
translate something from Max Weber into English. The proposal seemed exceedingly 
attractive, and I have started negotiations on it with several people.” 7 Parsons then asks 
Marianne Weber’s opinion, letting her know about his opinion regarding this editorial 
project: “Would you like to see this work of Max Weber appear in English? I do not 
know whether I am sufficiently familiar with the work of Max Weber and with the 
German language, such that I would be qualified to the task. Nevertheless, I shall do my 
best, because I believe that especially this essay will be exceedingly important for us in 
America and would deserve to be much better known.”  
As this letter suggests, the young Parsons’s involvement in the translation of The 
Protestant Ethic is a complex work in translation and editorial composition prone with 
consequences. Parsons’s translation choices, editorial decisions as to what text and by 
which order to include, and the paratext penned by him, offer us precious insight as to 
the dialectic between form and content through which his early sociological thinking 
unfolded. It was through editing, translating, and writing for the English version of 
Weber’s The Protestant Ethic that Parsons gradually reached what would be his mature 
understanding of Weber’s ideas. Quite literally, Parsons becomes a Weberian by 
immersing himself in the materiality of Weber’s ideas on the religious nature of 
capitalism, an intensive intellectual and manual labor of interpretation, translation, 
edition, and critical commentary between early 1927 and 1930, the time by which the 
book is eventually published in London and New York. A full understanding of this 
dialectic supposes answering a number of questions. To begin with, how did a 23-year-
old exchange student like Parsons ended up translating Weber’s essay? What did this 
editorial and translation work entailed exactly? And how did it impact Parsons’s future 
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views and choices? These are the three main questions we will try to answer in what 
follows. 
 Behind the choice of Parsons to act as translator into English of Weber’s The 
Protestant Ethic,
8
 along with the preface Weber had written for the entire collection of 
his world religion essays,
9
 lies not a publisher but a senior colleague, Professor Harry 
Elmer Barnes. It is Barnes, a historically-minded sociologist then based at Smith 
College, who first suggests that, with his language skills and academic training, Parsons 
would be the ideal person to translate Weber’s essay (Scaff 2005: 210). Parsons’ 
enthusiastic reply seems to have been motivated by at least two kinds of reasons. On the 
one hand, it seems to have been motivated by a genuine intellectual interest. As he will 
later recall, Weber’s linking of Puritanism and capitalism exerted a tremendous 
fascination upon him. (Parsons 1980: 39) This intellectual reason was complemented by 
another factor of more pragmatic nature. Upon his return to America, Parsons worked as 
instructor in the Amherst Department of Economics, teaching both an introductory 
economics course and his own senior course on “Recent European Social Developments 
and Social Theories.” Parsons’ consideration of Barnes’ proposal coincides with his 
preparation of the materials to give out to his students who did not read German, 
including The Protestant Ethic.
10
  
Besides Barnes, there is someone else who will act as a crucial facilitator once 
Parsons decides to take forward this project. This facilitator is no other than Weber’s 
widow and fierce gatekeeper of her late husband’s intellectual legacy – Marianne 
Weber. This unlikely alliance between a young American exchange student and 
Weber’s widow, an alliance that will only become more personal and stronger over the 
years, will prove invaluable in light of the exceedingly difficult negotiations with the 
German editor, Oskar Siebeck, and the English language publishers in London and New 
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York (see Scaff 2006: 70 ff.). It is Marianne Weber who mediates Parsons’ proposal for 
translation, first by contacting Siebeck herself, then by arranging a meeting with 
Parsons and Siebeck.
11
 This meeting led Parsons to a follow-up conversation with Oskar 
Siebeck, who reportedly “had a very good impression of him.” As Lawrence Scaff 
summarizes, without “Parsons’ stubborn persistence and Marianne Weber’s unwavering 
support, accepted by Siebeck, it is highly improbable the translation would have 
appeared at all, and certainly not when it did.” (2006: 72) 
 Parsons’s acting as editor and translator of Weber’s The Protestant Ethic takes 
place within a larger collective effort, involving over a dozen specialized academic and 
non-academic figures based in Germany, England and the United States over the course 
of three years, all sharing the same orientation towards the print publication of Weber’s 
text in English. The translation of Weber’s text was an international affair, with a 
German side keen on protecting both Weber’s intellectual legacy and the financial 
interests of his widow, and an Anglo-American front divided into editors interested in 
the commercial side of the venture and academic figures with different appreciations of 
Weber’s achievements. Caught in between this was a young Parsons, with no 
experience as translator and very little academic credentials. 
This meant Parsons performed a limited role in the decision-making process of 
what to publish. This does not mean, however, that he was not kept informed of the 
decisions and consulted on occasion. But it does mean that the main editorial decisions 
were taken elsewhere. It were the editors Oskar Siebeck, on the German side, and at 
first Kegan Paul and Alfred Knopf and then Stanley Unwin, on the English side, to 
decide the essential features of this translation, a process of strenuous negotiation that 
went on for several months with editorial, typographic and commercial decisions often 
clashing with academic and intellectual considerations. Contributing to this was the 
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nature of the work. Originally published as a two-part article and later published in 
revised form as a book,
12
 translating Die protestantische Ethik was always to be a 
difficult enterprise.  
At first, Parsons was of the opinion that the essay should have been translated 
not as a one-volume book, but as part of Weber’s 3-volume work on world’s religions, 
Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie.
13
 From a scholarly perspective, this 
would have been the most appropriate choice. The German editor, Oskar Siebeck, was 
of the same opinion. The problem was to convince the English and American editors, 
Kegan Paul in London and Alfred A. Knopf in New York, of the commercial viability 
and editorial interest of such an option. Kegan Paul and Knopf doubt that a massive 
three-volume work by a relatively unknown German scholar would sell, and insist in 
publishing only a segment: at first, there is an agreement to publish at least two out of 
the three volumes but this eventually flounders, putting the whole project at risk.  
This is when Parsons intervenes. He puts scholarly considerations aside and 
believing it was preferable to compromise rather than not having any translation, he 
urges Siebeck to consider translating only the first of the three volumes with another 
publisher. It works. Siebeck reaches out to Stanley Unwin in London, with whom he 
had already worked, with the proposal of having the first volume of Weber’s 
Religionssoziologie translated into English. Despite his reservations on working with an 
American translator, in July 1927 Unwin accepts Siebeck’s proposal of editing a one-
volume work composed of pages 1-275 of the first volume of Religionssoziologie. Upon 
further consideration of the commercial viability of the project, Unwin will backtrack 
and suggest the translation to be scaled back even further. The final round of 
negotiations between Unwin, on the one hand, and Siebeck, Marianne Weber and 
Parsons on the other, ends with an agreement that has been materialized in the book as 
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we know it today. The essay on the Protestant sects and the “Eileitung” to the 
subsequent series of essays on the world religions were dropped, but Weber’s 1920 
“Author’s Introduction” survives. This eleventh hour decision, for which Parsons was 
co-responsible, will have momentous consequences. Combined with his own 
“Translator’s Preface,” this paratext will prove invaluable for Parsons’s interpretation 
and appropriation of Weber. 
 But before we consider these paratexts, let us examine Parsons’s involvement 
with the text, a sensuous dialectic of material-formal considerations and intellectual 
decisions. An aspect often overlooked by contemporary commentators when assessing 
Parsons’s translation is the degree to which this work was subject to the constant 
editorial oversight on the part of Allen & Unwin.
14
 For one, the typography of Parsons’s 
translation draft was profoundly changed as a result of this oversight and ensuing 
interventions. Contrary to the common criticism that Parsons’s translation failed to keep 
Weber’s frequent use of italics and inverted commas (e.g. Ghosh 1994: 114), thus doing 
violence to the author’s nuanced line of reasoning, the fact is that this was the result of 
an explicit suggestion by R.H. Tawney (Scaff 2006: 77). The same happened to 
Parsons’s decision to keep Weber’s paragraphs intact and include marginal pagination 
references to the German original: paragraphs and sentences were altered and the 
marginal pagination dropped, again following Tawney’s recommendation. Parsons does 
not seem to have been consulted regarding the decision of replacing Weber’s copious 
footnotes by endnotes, a decision that profoundly affected the interpretation of the text 
insofar as much of Weber’s more qualified and nuanced reasoning occurs precisely in 
the footnotes. Parsons’s translation choices, however, seemed to have been left 
untouched. His stated aim of trying “to be faithful to the text rather than to present a 
work of art as far as English style is concerned”15 is an obvious understatement. Despite 
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its obvious conceptual inconsistencies (Ghosh 1994; Tribe 2007; Scaff 2014: 25) 
regarding central Weberian concepts such as Begriff (“concept”), Beruf (“calling, 
vocation, profession”), bürgerlich (“bourgeois”), or Lebensführung (“spirit, way of 
life”), Parsons’s translation of Weber remains second to none in its pathos, with 
memorable passages that eventually become an integral part of the Anglo-American 
sociological vocabulary.  
 Parsons’s “Translator’s Preface” features four main arguments, after briefly 
presenting the main facts regarding the text that had been translated. The first argument 
concerns Weber’s voluminous footnotes. Distancing himself from the editorial decision 
of publishing them at the end of the volume, Parsons advises to his readers a “careful 
perusal of the notes” since “a great deal of important material is contained in them.” He 
then reinforces this point and makes clear than his interpretation of Weber’s text and the 
material form imposed by Unwin were anything but coincident: “The fact that they are 
printed separately from the main text should not be allowed to hinder their use.” (1930: 
ix) The second argument is about the philosophy of translation. Parsons reiterates his 
earlier position regarding the priority given to accuracy over style: “The translation is, 
as far as is possible, faithful to the text, rather than attempting to achieve any more than 
ordinary, clear English style.” (1930: ix) The two last arguments are the most important. 
The first has to do with the “Introduction.” Crucially, Parsons does not mean 
Tawney’s 15-page foreword, written as an introductory text to The Protestant Ethic and 
that immediately follows Parsons’ preface. Indeed, he does not even mention Tawney’s 
text at all, a telling sign of his consideration of it. Instead, Parsons uses the designation 
“Introduction” – the main paratextual threshold of interpretation of any text – to refer to 
Weber’s 1920 “Vorbemerkung” (preface, introduction) to Religionssoziologie. This is 
one of the most controversial aspects of this edition. The editorial decision to compose 
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the work in this order – first, Parsons’s preface, followed by Tawney’s foreword, 
Weber’s introduction to Religionssoziologie, the text, and finally the endnotes – and 
Parsons’s argument that it “has been included in this translation because it gives some 
of the general background ideas and problems into which Weber himself meant this 
particular study of it,” led Weber’s 18-page long “Author’s Introduction” to be read by 
generations of English-speaking readers as the introduction to The Protestant Ethic. For 
some, the result of this dialectic between form and content was a serious confusion as 
the introduction outlines a broad question that the Protestant Ethic answers at best 
tangentially (Riesebrodt 2005: 25). Yet for Parsons this is to miss the point entirely. In 
his view, and this is a view Parsons will hold throughout his life (e.g. 1970; 1971a; 
1971b), Weber’s “Author’s Introduction” is the key to understand the deep meaning and 
broader sociological relevance of The Protestant Ethic.  
The last argument was about the relative worth of the text in the context of 
Weber’s sociological production. Parsons begins by recalling the omitted texts from the 
first volume of Religionssoziologie, which can only be read as yet another attempt of 
distancing himself from the editor’s decision. As a result, Parsons laments, what “is 
here presented to English-speaking readers is only a fragment.” But, he tells his readers, 
“it is a fragment which is in many ways of central significance for Weber’s philosophy 
of history, as well as being of very great and very general interest for the thesis it 
advances to explain some of the most important aspects of modern culture.” (1930: xi) 
With the stroke of a pen, and a limited yet crucial editorial influence on the material 
form of the work,
16
 Parsons positions The Protestant Ethic at the very heart of not only 
Weber’s oeuvre but of sociology itself. 
 Crucial for this positioning was the typographic positioning of Weber’s 
“Author’s Introduction” as the introduction to the translation of The Protestant Ethic 
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into English, as well as Parsons’s critical commentary on its relative importance, first, 
as we have just seen, in his own preface, and subsequently in his D.Phil. dissertation, 
published around the same time as The Protestant Ethic. Parts of Parsons’s dissertation 
can be read as a close, almost line by line, commentary of Weber’s “Author’s 
Introduction” and, to a less extent, of The Protestant Ethic. In the “Author’s 
Introduction” Weber begins with the research problem of why only in the West have 
cultural phenomena appeared that have a universal significance and value (1930: 13). 
Weber then enumerates the pre-conditions for this development: science, law, arts, 
education, bureaucracy and the state. He then turns to the origins of modern Western 
capitalism, whose main distinctive feature is the rational organization of labor (1930: 
21), although the separation of business from the household and rational bookkeeping 
were important too. Weber’s conclusion points towards the explanatory role of the 
societal process of rationalization (1930: 26), and justifies the inclusion of The 
Protestant Ethic as an historical case that illuminates the unintended consequences of 
the long-forgotten religious origins of this process (1930: 27).  
For Benjamin Nelson, the last writing to have been penned by Weber “offers us 
insights afforded only obliquely and intermittently elsewhere” and is the clearest 
example of Weber’s “mature awareness that the realization of his master purposes as a 
sociologist was not possible without a definite commitment to a perspective he himself 
called ‘universal historical.’” (1974: 271) For Parsons, the “Author’s Introduction” had 
an even more personal meaning. It had provided him with the key to his coming to 
terms with Weber’s sociology. This was the text through which he realized the 
methodological-historical significance of The Protestant Ethic, became a Weberian, and 
was to provide him with a stepping stone for a non-materialistic yet non-utilitarian 
sociological theory of action. Composed over three strenuous years, under severe 
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commercial constraints and involving an international team of collaborators centred 
around the unlikely figure of a young Talcott Parsons, the first English rendition of The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism is published by George Allen & Unwin in 
London in June 1930, and by Scribner’s in New York a few months later. 
 
From translator to interpreter: The Protestant Ethic and the second D.Phil. 
dissertation 
This work of composition and translation had an immediate and lasting impact upon 
Parsons. It made him rethink his interpretation of Weber, an intellectual development 
that is most clear when one compares the two versions of the D.Phil. thesis. The 
German version, composed before Parsons embarks on the translation of The Protestant 
Ethic, concluded with critical notes regarding Weber’s supposed utilitarianism and the 
conceptual ambiguity of his definition of capitalism. The English version, written after 
he begins his work of translation and submitted on July 12, 1927 in Heidelberg, is 
noticeably different. This means that, contrary to what has been widely believed, the 
English dissertation was not the starting point of Parsons’s interpretation of Weber. 
Rather, it was the end point of an attempt at understanding Weber with the help of 
Weber’s own methodological tools. How did Parsons arrive at this position? 
 To begin with, the English version is about half the length of the German one. 
Parsons’s audacious move meant that he eventually submits only a revised version of 
the two main chapters of his first dissertation, dropping the preface, the introductory 
chapter on Passow, von Below and Brentano, as well as the last two chapters. The 
imaginary lost chapter on Marx remained only that, a myth Parsons fed over the years. 
More important, however, were the changes Parsons made to his argument in the 
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chapters on Sombart and, in particular, on Weber. One can almost picture Parsons at his 
desk at Amherst typing these two new chapters, with the German dissertation on one 
side, and his “translation sample” of The Protestant Ethic, including Weber’s “Author’s 
Introduction,” on the other. 
 The outcome of this was a new, more sophisticated understanding of Weber’s 
thinking. In the remaining of this section, we will follow Parsons’s interventions in his 
dissertation, sometimes in the form of deletions, sometimes in the form of additions, in 
others still Parsons’s interventions consisted in moving certain passages from one place 
in the argument to another. Parson’s “construction” of Weber emerges thus as a 
dialectic process triggered by the German dissertation, mediated by the translation and 
editorial composition of The Protestant Ethic, and concluded with the English version 
of the D.Phil.. It is in the differences between the two versions of the dissertation, which 
can be traced back to the Parsons’s work as translator-interpreter in the first half of 
1927, that the evolution of Parsons’s appropriation of Weber comes out more clearly.  
 The first difference concerns the framing of the discussion. Whereas in the 
German dissertation Parsons begins by addressing what he designates as a problem of 
“conceptual ambiguity” between the notions of capitalism in general and modern 
capitalism in Weber’s writings – a theoretical dead end – now the angle is thoroughly 
theoretical-methodological. This is a crucial change. It allows Parsons to build upon 
Weber and start erecting his own approach. He maintains a critical attitude toward 
Weber (that Weber had confused modern capitalism with capitalism in general), but 
now this is framed within a detailed discussion of ideal-types as a theoretical-
methodological strategy to gain “understanding” of historical phenomena, both in their 
uniqueness and in what they share with all other historical cases.  
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The uniqueness of “historical individuals,” that is, historical cases composed of a 
number of interlinked social agents, is expressed in the “infinite variety of facts from 
which a selection for purposes of analysis must be made.” (1929: 20) Given the 
historically contingent character of such historical cases, “the discovery of uniform 
relations and their formulation in terms of ‘laws’ cannot be the objective of such a 
science.” (1929: 20) For that, one needs to overcome the particular nature of historical 
“understanding” and reach the level of a general explanatory theory. This second type of 
“‘understanding’ Weber attempts to attain by means of the ideal type.” An ideal type, 
Parsons explains, is “a special construction in the mind of the investigator of what 
social action would be if it were directed with perfect rationality toward a given end. 
(…) It is a picture of what things would be under ‘ideal,’ not actual, conditions.” (1929: 
20-21) Equipped with this instrument of analysis, the investigator ceases to be a “‘mere’ 
historian” (1929: 5) and becomes able to produce (sociological) theory, i.e. “a consistent 
and unified system of concepts to be used in the analysis of social phenomena.” (1929: 
5) The same is to say, in the eyes of Parsons, Weber ceases to be a mere economic 
historian and becomes a sociological theorist whose ideal-type methodology allows him 
to compare the “actual record of events in many different instances and thus attempt to 
‘understand’ them, each in its individual uniqueness, by seeing how far they conform to 
action rationally directed toward the given ends, and to distinguish such elements as are 
not ‘understandable’ in these terms.” (1929: 21)  
 Bruce C. Wearne rightly called our attention long ago to the fact that the young 
Parsons “used this instrument himself in his investigation of Weber’s thought” (1989: 
47) and that Weber’s “Author’s Introduction” acted as a “kind of ideal-typical 
representation of Weber’s sociology as a whole.” (1989: 48) But what Wearne fails to 
appreciate is the extent to which these hermeneutical moves by Parsons were the result 
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of a laborious rewriting of his German dissertation through a closer contact with 
Weber’s writings – maxime, The Protestant Ethic, the 1920 “Author’s Introduction,” 
but also sections of Economy and Society regarding charisma and routine – that he was 
translating into English and teaching his students at Amherst.  
 All other differences result to a certain extent to this first, crucial difference. The 
second difference concerns Weber’s concept of capitalism in general. First, whereas in 
the German dissertation, Parsons uses Weber’s writings on “Agrarian Relations” and 
the 1920 “Author’s Introduction” to illustrate Weber’s concept of capitalism in general, 
in the English dissertation this is replaced by a thoroughly methodological analysis of 
that concept. The references to Weber’s writings are relegated to the endnotes. (1929: 
22) Second, and more importantly, this leads Parsons to a different conclusion regarding 
this aspect of Weber’s theory. In the German dissertation, Parsons had concluded that 
the difference between modern capitalism and capitalism in general was a question of 
degree. In the English dissertation, Parsons maintains this idea but adds: “But that is not 
the whole story, as will be shown presently.” (1929: 24) Parsons then offers a new 
conclusion to his discussion of capitalism in general. Whereas before it included a 
description of two characteristics (its peaceful and calculable character), which are now 
under the discussion of modern capitalism, the new conclusion is that Weber uses a 
characteristic feature of modern society – namely, “a thoroughgoing systematization 
and adaptation of practical life to a particular set of ideals” (1929: 24) – to define 
capitalism in general, which “indicates that he did not clearly distinguish in his own 
mind the two separate concepts of capitalism to be found in his work.” (1929: 24) 
  The third difference has to do with Parsons’s examination of Weber’s notion of 
modern capitalism. The first thing that changes is Parsons’s depiction of modern 
capitalism as a “historical individual,” following his new theoretical-methodological 
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understanding of Weber’s work. This paves the way to a whole new structure of 
Parsons’s argument regarding modern capitalism. Showing the influence of a closer 
reading of Weber’s “Author’s Introduction,” which is analysed by Parsons step by step 
in this segment of his dissertation, he begins by inserting the theme of rationalization 
right at the outset of the discussion of modern capitalism. This is absent from the 
German dissertation. In here, Parsons had discussed successively bookkeeping, 
socialism, bureaucracy, and concluded with a lengthy description of the argument of 
The Protestant Ethic. The result of this was a (misguided) criticism of Weber’s 
materialism and a methodological criticism that failed to do justice to Weber’s actual 
usage of the concept of the ideal-type. The structure of the English dissertation is very 
different: it discusses bookkeeping, bureaucracy, socialism, and the spirit of capitalism. 
This discussion of the spirit of capitalism replaces the description of The Protestant 
Ethic that can be found in the German dissertation. Parsons now offers his readers a 
methodological discussion of the relative place of that historical case within Weber’s 
general theory. In particular, Weber is now credited for having developed a theory of 
modern capitalism, in the sense of a “historical individual,” around two key 
contributions: the exclusion of capitalist adventurers because their irrationality directly 
contradicts the fundamental trait of modern society – rationality – and the concept of the 
spirit of capitalism, “which takes its departure from the dominant fact of rational 
bureaucratic organization.” (1929: 27)  
Like in the German dissertation, Parsons then questions the “significance” of 
“this theory of the spirit of capitalism for Weber’s view of capitalism as a whole.” 
(1929: 30) While in the German dissertation the answer involved criticizing Weber for 
having made materialism the distinctive feature of the capitalist age and conceived of 
the spirit of capitalism as a social ethics that led into utilitarianism, in the English 
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version all references to the alleged materialism and utilitarianism of Weber’s thesis 
were dropped. All Parsons left after his revision was the much milder conclusion that 
Weber “does accept economic determinism as a characteristic of capitalism, and thus 
gives it a relative validity.” (1929: 32) Parsons’s new answer to the question of the 
significance of the (historically contingent) spirit of capitalism is that it allows us to see 
the main features of capitalism in general: the economic system as a whole, once 
refracted from the historical lenses of the spirit of capitalism, emerges as objective, 
rational, ascetic, mechanistic, and structural. (1929: 31) The significance of this change 
should not be overlooked. This is because of what Parsons had to say in The Structure 
of Social Action about utilitarianism (Lidz 2010: 45). Attesting the relevance of the 
German dissertation as an historical document, here we find material evidence of the 
development of Parsons’s theorizing, from this early interpretation of Weber and The 
Protestant Ethic as proto-materialist and utilitarian, to the mature view (Parsons 1968: 
87-125) that a key element of the Weberian legacy is the distinction between 
utilitarianism (anomic, selfish behaviour) and voluntarism, understood as normatively 
regulated community-oriented behavior.  
The fourth difference lies in the way Parsons concludes the dissertation. 
Whereas Parsons had concluded the German dissertation pointing to Weber’s tragic 
fatalism but offering no real alternative, as all that he asked from Weber was more 
conceptual clarity in the definition of capitalism, he concludes the English dissertation 
with a strikingly different note. This is a note of optimism, both ethical and theoretical. 
Offering a more substantial analysis of Weber’s treatment of the relation between 
charisma and routine, which had led Weber to the pessimistic view that “the really vital 
human forces appear only in charismatic forms” and that capitalism “presents a dead, 
mechanized condition of society in which there is no room left for these truly creative 
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forces because all human activity is forced to follow the ‘system,’” (1929: 33) Parsons 
develops an alternative ethical-political scenario out of his new theoretical-
methodological understanding of Weber’s work.  
A crucial addition to the English dissertation is the insight right at the outset of 
the chapter on Weber that ideal types refer to one aspect or side of a historical case, and 
are a means to an end, while “historical individuals” cover the whole essence of the 
phenomena and constitute the end of the research itself. (1929: 21-22) Parsons criticizes 
Weber for not following through with this distinction between a historical and a 
methodological form of the concept of the ideal-type. This novel understanding permits 
Parsons to point to a way out of the rationalization conundrum envisaged by Weber 
under the Nietzschean spell: “Weber’s ironbound process of rationalization lies in the 
isolation of one aspect of social development and the attribution of historical reality to 
an ideal type which was never meant to represent it.” Parsons concluded: “If this error is 
corrected the absolute domination of the process of rationalization over the whole social 
process falls to the ground.” (1929: 35) His ethical-political alternative was clear too. 
“But is it not possible”, Parsons asked referring to the “either, or” terms in which Weber 
conceives of the charisma-routine relationship, “that all manner of combinations 
between them are possible, and that the present-day power of the bureaucratic 
mechanism is due to a very special set of circumstances which do not involve the 
necessity for its continued dominance over life, but leave the possibility open that it may 
again be made to serve ‘spiritual’ aims?” (1929: 34 – our emphasis) 
Translating, editing and teaching The Protestant Ethic in 1926-1927 in Amherst 
gave Parsons the theoretical-methodological means to read Weber in a “progressive 
light” (Brick 1994: 372) and to realize that we were not condemned to Weber’s 
pessimistic fatalism – instead, one could use the creative power of theoretical reflection 
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to become optimistic again. (Wearne 1989: 56) This is the real origin of Parsons’s 
famous “Agenda of 1927,” (Brick 1994: 369 ff.) the social reformist and neo-Kantian 
epistemology agenda that Parsons will pursue after the submission of the English 
dissertation until the publication of The Structure of Social Action in 1937. The two 
basic premises of this agenda are Weberian, and can be traced back to this crucial 
juncture when Parsons revises his German dissertation and for the first time articulates 
his mature vision. The first premise is that sociology should be founded upon the study 
of social action in terms of the subjective motives that guide it. The second premise is 
the neo-Kantian emphasis on theory as guiding scientific research: this will push 
Parsons to develop highly abstract and general sociological theory. The next step was 
for Parsons to compare Weber’s contributions to those from other theorists. This will 
eventually lead Parsons to consider the works of Alfred Marshall, Vilfredo Pareto, 
Emile Durkheim and Max Weber and look for incipient traces of a common 
“voluntaristic theory of action.” In time, this will coalesce into the “narrative of 
voluntarism” (Scaff 2014: 283), the image that will capture the imagination of 
American readers in the 1950s and 1960s around the idea of religious sects and their 
effects upon individual and social action. It is by selectively appropriating Weber for his 
purposes that Parsons, in combination with contributions from other seminal thinkers, 
will build the grand theoretical scheme that will reign supreme in American post-war 
sociology.  
One should not forget, however, of the starting point of this theoretical 
pilgrimage. Out of the dialectic between form and content emerges a sort of interaction 
effect, namely between the translation work and theory building, and from theory 
building back to translation choices. Parsons’s often commented but little understood 
choice to expurgate his English rendition of The Protestant Ethic from most 
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Nietzschean references, especially at the end of the text, have to be understood in this 
context. To allow Nietzsche’s influence over Weber’s thesis to remain a visible force 
would be tantamount of defeat to fatalism.
17
 On the contrary, having found the way out 
of Weber’s self-imposed pessimism in a theoretically grounded optimism, Parsons was 
seemingly happy to sacrifice textual accuracy for theoretical solutions. If to translate is 
indeed a form of interpretation, and interpretation is also to be evaluated in terms of its 
world-making capacities, then the liberties Parsons gave himself in translating Weber 
are amply justified.  
 
Conclusion 
The tactile-intellectual sense of attachment Parsons felt to this little book should not be 
discounted. Next to Parsons’s voluminous intellectual production, one may be tempted 
to think of it as juvenile episode of little consequence. Nothing could be more 
misleading, however. On the contrary, Parsons consistently thought of his first editorial 
project as a Janus-faced icon, a material signifier that provided a link to one of the 
“immortals” (1980: 43) in sociology while acting as an exemplary for future 
sociological research, as he emphasized in his last public lectures which he delivered 
virtually in the shadow of Weber’s statue in Munich the day before his death. And he 
did not hesitate to act when he felt his bond with the work was either in need of renewal 
or somehow in danger. Two examples suffice to illustrate Parsons’s strong heartfelt 
feelings of attachment to this work.  
The first example is the new preface Parsons writes for the first paperback 
reissue of the work. In fact, The Protestant Ethic had a difficult reception in the period 
leading to the war
18
 and only started to gain traction after 1945. (Roth 1999: 521) It will 
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take a further decade and a new material form to finally reach the masses of 
undergraduate and graduate students of the post-war years.
19
 Published in the Scribner 
Library, a series of best-selling classics in paperback established in 1958, The 
Protestant Ethic gained a new life. Contributing to this new life was Parsons’s “Preface 
to New Edition,” where he begins exactly by expressing his “great satisfaction” with 
this new edition, “given the kind of status as a modern classic which, for serious 
scholarly books, comes with issue to the paper cover trade.” (1958: xii) Thirty years had 
passed since the first English translation and the lessons to be learned from the work 
had changed accordingly. In typical fashion, Parsons equates the progress made by the 
social sciences in this period with the development of his structural-functionalist version 
of systems theory: “Weber’s trend of interpretation of the modern industrial society was 
couched within the framework of a more general theoretical analysis of the structure 
and functioning of social systems.” (1958: xv) Reiterating the “convergence thesis” of 
The Structure of Social Action, Parsons argues that “the important thing about Weber’s 
work was not how he judged the relative importance or of economic factors, but rather 
the way in which he analyzed the systems of social action within which ideas and values 
as well as “economic forces” operate to influence action.” (1958: xvi) The convergence 
of Weber’s contribution with those from Durkheim, Cooley, Mead and Freud was 
obvious in Parsons’s eyes.  
 The second example is the controversy
20
 between Parsons and the British 
sociologist Anthony Giddens over the control of The Protestant Ethic and, by extension, 
of the interpretation of Weber’s legacy.21 At the centre of the controversy is the Allen 
and Unwin 1976 edition of The Protestant Ethic,
 
the first new edition since 1930.
22 
The 
controversy between Parsons and Giddens originates in the fact that neither the 
publisher, nor Giddens seek to get Parsons’ consent before moving ahead. To make 
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matters worse, this new edition had been scheduled without Parsons’s “Translator’s 
Preface” of 1930 and also leaving out his “Preface to New Edition” of 1958. Parsons’ 
translation of Weber’s “Author’s Introduction” was to be retained, however. Crucially, 
this new edition was to include a newly written introduction by Giddens. Giddens, then 
fellow of King’s College, Cambridge, was a rising star in the sociological establishment 
partly due to his theoretical attempt to replace what he believed to be Parsons’ idealist 
reading of Weber for an interpretation of Weber as a conflict theorist.
23
  
 The controversy between Parsons and Giddens originates in the fact that neither 
the publisher, nor Giddens seek to get Parsons’ consent before moving ahead. To make 
matters worse, this new edition had been scheduled without Parsons’s “Translator’s 
Preface” of 1930 and also leaving out his “Preface to New Edition” of 1958. Parsons’ 
translation of Weber’s “Author’s Introduction” was to be retained, however. Crucially, 
this new edition was to include a newly written introduction by Giddens. An exchange 
of angry and apologetic correspondence between Parsons, Giddens, and the publisher in 
London, led to a compromise: Parsons’s ‘Translator’s Preface’ of 1930 would be 
reinstated.  
The lesson to be drawn from these two examples is that crucial struggles over 
the control of meaning are played through socio-technical inscription devices such as 
the book. While the first case illustrates how Parsons used The Protestant Ethic as a 
mobile material outlet to promulgate his ideas, the second shows his willingness to react 
to any perceived threat to that editorial control over the work. Likewise, Giddens’s 
career as social theorist is virtually impossible to understand in its scope and 
consequences without reference to his parallel work as editor and commentator. 
Translators, but also editors and commentators, are key agents in the politics of the 
book. 
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1
 ‘The importing, he explained, consisted of focusing the attention of American sociology in the 
nineteen-thirties on two great European social theorists, Max Weber and Emile Durkheim, who, 
though very different, tended to think in grand theoretical terms. Until then, American 
sociologists, with one or two important exceptions, had been concerned mainly with empirical 
studies of rather localized phenomena.’ (Reinhold 1973: 80) 
2
 In their study of the process of publication and reception of Weber’s Protestant Ethic, Swatos 
and Kivisto (2005) show that translators, reviewers and commentators acted as gatekeepers to 
Weberian sociology in the United States. Likewise, Connell argues that: “the process of 
translation is an important index of the formation of a canon.” (Connell 1997: 1543), but says 
nothing about the intricacies of the translation process itself. Ricoeur, on the contrary, has a lot 
to say about translation as an interpretive act: this is why we follow Ricoeur in this regard. 
3
 The dissertation survives today in the Harvard University Archives, Parsons Papers, HUGFP 
42.8.2, box 1. 
4
 Parsons, of course, will use the same expression when referring to his synthetic narrative 
account of Durkheim’s sociological contributions in The Structure of Social Action: “…it is 
necessary to resort to a certain amount of construction” he says “and to put things somewhat 
differently from the way in which Durkheim himself did.” (1968: 400) 
5
 Contrary to what Uta Gerhardt suggests. See Gerhardt (2011: 69). 
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6
 This was a requirement for obtaining the doctor in philosophy degree, which Parsons will 
eventually be awarded in April 1929. The best description of these events is in Gerhardt (2011: 
71-72) 
7
 HUGFP 42.8.2, Box 2. 
8
 ‘Weber’s first work to be translated into English was, likewise, not the PESC but the 
posthumous General Economic History (German publication, 1923; translation 1927)’ (Swatos 
and Kivisto: 119) 
9
 The 1906 essay was subsequently translated and separately published by Hans H. Gerth and C. 
Wright Mills in the collection From Max Weber. 
10
 Parsons was asked ‘to give the students [of his introductory course on ‘Principles of 
economics’] some acquaintance with the doctrines of German sociologists and some knowledge 
of the developments of social institutions in Europe since the industrial revolution.’ (71) in 
‘Memorandum re work of Parsons, from Professor Meriam to President Olds’, HUGFP, 42.8.2, 
Box 2.  
11
  Parsons returns to Heidelberg and meets Marianne Weber. In 26 June, 1927 this crucial 
facilitator writes: “Dear Mr. Parsons! I would like to invite you to come to my house for tea at 5 
o’clock this coming Sunday, 26th. We shall then also talk about your proposal for translation, 
which I have passed on to the publisher some time ago.” HUGFP 42.8.2, Box 2. 
12 There is a single essay, what we might call the “original” Protestant Ethic, that was published 
in German in two parts in 1904-05 in the Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, of 
which Max Weber was principal co-editor. Unfortunately, to complicate matters right off, the 
1904 volume bore a 1905 date. In 1906, Weber published an additional essay on organized 
religion in North America, in two different German periodicals. During the years 1907-10, two 
critiques of the essays appeared in Germany, to which Weber also responded in the Archiv. 
These have become known as his “anticritical remarks.” In 1919, Weber reedited the 1904-05 
and 1906 essays as a whole, and in 1920, they were published in the first part of a three-volume 
collection of studies on the world’s religions. (Swatos 2005: xiii) Contrary to Weber’s claim in 
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the first footnote to the second edition that he had not altered any sentence which contained any 
essential point (PESC 1930: 187), there are actually numerous and substantial enough changes 
to alter the meaning of the text: Lichtblau and Weiss (1993) have identified no less than 448 
differences between the two versions, including both inserts in the main text and additional 
footnotes. 
13
 The second edition of The Protestant Ethic is included in Weber’s Collected Essays in the 
Sociology of Religion. Besides The Protestant Ethic and the essay on Protestant Sects, this 
collection contains the studies of the Economic Ethics of the World Religions. These texts were 
taken apart and published separately when translated into English, severing them from the 
theoretical essays in which they were originally embedded in. The introduction to the Economic 
Ethics of the World Religions and the theoretical chapter explaining the transition from Chinese 
to Indian religions were published separately. The major substantive studies have been 
published as The Religion of China, The Religion of India, and Ancient Judaism as if they were 
independent monographs. Readers would hardly be aware that they originally belonged to a 
series of studies called the Economic Ethics of the World Religions. Moreover, in order to fit 
The Protestant Ethic into this new context, Weber wrote an introduction, translated as ‘Author’s 
Introduction,’ which attempted to explain how these different studies fit together. (Riesebrodt 
2005: 24-5) 
14
 In total, Scaff suggests a total of nine people have read and commented on Parsons’s “sample 
translation:” Stanley Unwin himself, three anonymous in-house reviewers, two professional 
translators, R.H. Tawney, Oskar Siebeck and Marianne Weber (2006: 75-77). 
15
 Letter of 24 September 1928 to Stanley Unwin. HUGFP 42.8.2 Box 2. 
16
 This crucial aspect is overlooked by Bruce Wearne who focuses exclusively in the ideational 
dimension of this process. Wearne writes: “Parsons’ interpretative involvement in the writings 
qua translator, secondary analyst and critical theorist led him to conclude that ‘The Protestant 
Ethic’ is in many ways of central significance for Weber’s philosophy of history.” (1989: 58) 
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17
 Unsurprisingly, the “postmodern Weber” of the 1980s, a product of the revival of interest in 
Nietzsche (e.g. Stauth and Turner 1988), is fundamentally pessimistic.  
18
 In the first three years it will sell only 1009 copies. The governing director of Allen & Unwin 
wrote to J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) in Tübingen on July 30, 1934: “The total sales up to the 
end of last year were 409 copies, apart from 600 sold at a reduced price in sheets to an 
American publisher [Scribner], thus making the total sales up to 31st December last 1,009. 
There is now very little demand for the book, and it is unlikely that we shall ever sell as many as 
2,500 copies.” (in Collection Max Weber-Schaefer, Bavarian State Library, Munich) 
19
 Uta Gerhardt writes: “(…) after World War II, the book became a bestseller, with a second 
printing in 1948, a third in 1950, and a fourth in 1952.” (2011: 62) Gerhardt’s mistake is to 
confuse reprints for sales. Archival research undertaken at the George Allen and Unwin Archive 
(herewith GAUA), University of Reading, UK, however, shows that such reprints often did not 
exceed 750 copies each. Scribner’s editor orders from Stanley Unwin 750 copies of The 
Protestant Ethic (letter May 26, 1950. GAUA). As proof of their appreciation for the continuing 
collaboration in publishing this title, Unwin suggests to have the book published as a ‘joint 
imprint’ with both publishing houses names in the title page and the jackets (letter 27 June, 
1950. GAUA). On March 17, 1952 Scribner’s orders another 1,000 copies (letter 2 April, 1952. 
GAUA) Far from being a bestseller, the truth is that by the late 1950s the book was selling so 
poorly that was at the verge of going out of print. This despite the wave of new translations of 
Weber’s works of the 1950s (Gerhardt 2011: 63, n.29): the steady decline of sales of The 
Protestant Ethic reported by Allen & Unwin in 1958 suggests these new translations had little 
or no immediate effect in increasing the market interest in Weber. 
20
 See HUGFP – 42.8.8, box 11. 
21
 The theoretical attack on Parsons’ Weber, of course, cannot be fully (or, even, primarily) 
attributed to Giddens. Crucial in this regard was, for instance, the highly influential essay “De-
Parsonizing Weber: A Critique of Parsons’ Interpretation of Weber's Sociology” (1975), in 
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which the authors developed a devastating attack on Parsons’ choices as translator and work as 
theorist. To which, characteristically, Parsons replied in kind: see Parsons (1975). 
22
 The 1958 edition and paperbacks from the 1960s were technically reprints of the original 
1930 edition with the exception of the new preface by Parsons and some new graphic features. 
23
 Decisive in this regard were two books in which Giddens framed Weber’s contributions in a 
radically different way from that of Parsons. The first is Capitalism and Social Theory (1971), 
which “officially” identified Marx, Weber and Durkheim as thinkers who established 
foundational frameworks for contemporary sociology, despite the seemingly arbitrary nature of 
this choice. The second was the 1972 Politics and Sociology in the Thought of Max Weber. 
Giddens will be eventually accompanied in his interpretation by figures such as Michael Mann 
or Randall Collins, the eminent Weberian expert and editor of the second Roxbury edition of 
The Protestant Ethic (1998). 
24
 Scribner’s editor orders from Stanley Unwin 750 copies of PESC (letter May 26, 1950. 
GAUA). As proof of their appreciation for the continuing collaboration in publishing this title, 
Unwin suggests to have the book published as a ‘joint imprint’ with both publishing houses 
names in the title page and the jackets (letter 27 June, 1950. GAUA).  
25
 On March 17, 1952 Scribner’s orders another 1,000 copies (letter 2 April, 1952. GAUA) 
